When agents violate norms, they are typically judged to be more of a cause of resulting outcomes. In this paper, we suggest that norm violations also affect the causality attributed to other agents, a phenomenon we refer to as ''causal superseding.'' We propose and test a counterfactual reasoning model of this phenomenon in four experiments. Experiments 1 and 2 provide an initial demonstration of the causal superseding effect and distinguish it from previously studied effects. Experiment 3 shows that this causal superseding effect is dependent on a particular event structure, following a prediction of our counterfactual model. Experiment 4 demonstrates that causal superseding can occur with violations of non-moral norms. We propose a model of the superseding effect based on the idea of counterfactual sufficiency.
Introduction
In the 1870 case of Carter v. Towne, the court faced an intriguing causal question. The defendant sold gunpowder to a child. The child's mother and aunt hid the gunpowder, but in a location that they knew the child could find and access. The child found the gunpowder and was injured. The court judged that the defendant could not be considered to be the cause of the child's injuries, because of the negligence of the mother and aunt (Hart & Honoré, 1985, pp. 281-282) .
This case leaves us with an interesting puzzle about causal reasoning. The question before the court was not whether the mother and aunt caused the outcome; it was whether the defendant caused the outcome. Yet the court determined that the fact that the actions of the mother and aunt were negligent had some effect on the causal relationship between the defendant's actions and the outcome. This suggests a broader phenomenon of causal reasoning: the extent to which one agent is perceived to have caused an outcome may be affected not only by his or her own actions, but also by the normative status of other people's actions. We refer to this as 'causal superseding'.
It is well-established that judgments of norm violations, such as moral norm violations, can affect causal judgments. An agent who acts in a way that is judged to be morally wrong is seen as more causal than an agent whose actions conform with moral norms (e.g., Alicke, 1992) . Recent work has suggested that, rather than being about morality specifically, these effects are rooted in the normality of an agent's actions, i.e., how much they diverge from prescriptive or statistical norms (Halpern & Hitchcock, 2014; Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009 ; but see Alicke, Rose, & Bloom, 2011) . However, most of the work to date has focused on how the normality of an agent's actions affects that agent's own causality, not anyone else's. The present experiments aim to demonstrate and http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.01.013 0010-0277/Ó 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
